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cerning the technological value of this enormous expenditure caused the department to undertake an investigation, Project Hindsight. This study took eight years and consumed some forty man-years of time on the part of thirteen teams of scientists and engineers who analyzed the key contributions which had made possible the development of the twenty weapons systems that constituted, in large part, the core of the nation's defense arsenal. Some 700 key contributions or "events" were isolated. They were classified as being either technological or scientific. If the latter, they were further subdivided into basic and applied-science "events."3
The preliminary results of Project Hindsight, which were released in November 1966, came as something of a bombshell to the scientific community. Of all "events," 91 percent were technological, only 9 percent were classed as science. Within the latter category 8.7 percent were applied science; only 0.3 percent, or two "events," were due to basic or undirected science.4 Predictably, the publication of these results produced a spate of indignant letters to the editors of Science. Many of these missed the point. The investigators had not sought to show that science has no influence on technology. What they did demonstrate was that the immediate, direct influence has been small; they showed that the traditional model of sciencetechnology relations is in need of revision. To correct the misunderstanding of Project Hindsight, a subsequent study, TRACES, demonstrated the dependence of five recent innovations on prior scientific work. The question, therefore, is not whether science has influenced technology, but rather the precise nature of the interaction.6 The results of Project Hindsight are surprising only if one assumes the validity of the received model of science-technology relationships. This model is not so much false as misleading. It assumes that science and technology represent different functions performed by the same community. But a fundamental fact is that they constitute different communities, each with its own goals and systems of values. They are, of course, similar in that both deal with matter and energy. But these similarities should not be overstated. Each community has its own social controls-such as its reward system-which tend to focus the work of each on its own needs. These needs determine not only the objects of concern, but the "language" in which they are discussed. These needs may overlap; but it would be surprising if this were a very frequent occurrence. One would expect that in the normal case science would beget more science, and technology would lead to further technology. This is precisely the finding of Project Hindsight.
The difficulties of the traditional model may be illustrated by the relationship, or lack of one, between Newtonian mechanics and the "golden age" of mechanical invention in America in the 19th century. An enthusiastic group of scientists, technologists, and reformers in America, as in Europe, were attempting to foster the application of science to technology. Among them was James Renwick, professor of natural experimental philosophy and chemistry at Columbia College. He wrote two books that were intended to bridge the gap between art and science. The first, The Elements of Mechanics, published in 1832, was a conventional exposition of the science of mechanics. In it Renwick followed a well-trodden path in treating systems in equilibrium by the principle of virtual velocities.7 The second book, his Applications of the Science of Mechanics to Practical Purposes, published in 1842, surveyed the field of mechanical technology, including prime movers, clocks, and various types of machinery.8 But despite Renwick's earnest efforts, the principles of the first book did not carry over to the second to any significant degree.
A mechanic interested in designing a water wheel would have found the methods and principles of the first book of little value, John Smeaton, the 18th-century British engineer, had used the experimental methods of science to derive a set of "maxims" or design principles for this type of prime mover. Two of these may be quoted as examples:9
In a given undershot wheel, if the quantity of water expended be given, the useful effect is as the square of the velocity, and In a given undershot wheel, if the aperture whence the water flows be given, the effect is as the cube of the velocity.
Neither could be classed as laws of nature; they were lawlike statements about man-made devices. They were not logical deductions from the science of mechanics; they constituted the germ of a new technological science. Far from constituting a unity, Renwick's two books pointed to two quite different lines of technological development. Technology might, as suggested by his first book, build directly on the foundations of science. The science of mechanics could be extended to create new, technologically oriented sciences such as the strength of materials and hydraulics. Or, following Smeaton, technologists might borrow the methods of science to found new sciences built on existing craft practices.
To some extent inventors helped to develop technological sciences. Oliver Evans attempted to apply scientific methods to technology in his The Young Mill-Wright and Miller's Guide published in 1795. Evans began with a survey of the principles of mechanics, and he was able to derive useful design principles directly from them. But his chief reliance was on the application of scientific methods, rather than deductions from existing laws. He derived a set of "rules" for designing mills, including a critical examination of Smeaton's "maxims." But Evans attempted to go further and he devised a set of rules for making inventions in any field. These amounted to applying scientific methods to technology. Included were the discovery of fundamental principles, making deductions from these principles, and testing the results by experiment.10 It is, of course, very difficult to discover which works were read by specific inventors; it is even harder to establish a correlation between particular inventions and prior published information. But it is easy to show that there was a vast increase in the volume of written, more or less systematic technical information available to American inventors in the course of the 19th century.11 This was part of a worldwide movement that had its origins in the great encyclopedias of the 18th century. Oliver Evans, much of whose inventive career came before 1800, recalled that the chief impediment for the inventor was the lack of reliable published information.12 By the middle of the 19th century, through the efforts of men like Evans and Renwick, this barrier to invention had been largely removed.
Inventors might apply scientific methods; but despite the work of a few like Evans, the inventor was ill-adapted to the task of building up technological sciences. Scientists, on the other hand, had the necessary skills, and they played a vital role in stimulating the development of engineering sciences. But scientists lacked the lasting commitment and the intimate knowledge of technology and its needs that was required. The bulk of the effort to build technological sciences, therefore, fell on the engineering profession itself. The engineering sciences, by 1900, constituted a complex system of knowledge, ranging from highly systematic sciences to collections of "how to do it" rules in engineering handbooks.13 Some, like the strength of materials and hydraulics, built directly on science; they were often classed as branches of physics. Others, such as the kinematics of mechanisms, evolved from engineering practice. In either case, their development involved the adoption by engineers of the theoretical and experimental methods of science, along with many of ence to that of technology, it went through an important transformation. Its ties with physics were weakened, and it developed in ways uncharacteristic of the basic sciences. At the same time, its range of technological usefulness was gradually expanded. Scientists tended to explain their findings by reference to the most fundamental entities, such as atoms, ether, and forces. But these entities cannot always be observed directly. To be useful to a designer, however, a formulation must deal with measurable entities, particularly those of importance to the practical man. These need not be fundamental in the scientific sense. The scientists who had done so much to found a science of the strength of materials-notably Young, Coulomb, and Poisson-strove to found this study on the same ontological basis as classical mechanics-that is, they sought to explain their results in terms of molecules and the forces between them. Although not without interest, these efforts were not wholly successful. They were also needless complications from the technological point of view. A few of the engineers poineering in this field, including Navier and Saint-Venant, continued this quest, but in the end the attempt was abandoned.l5 Instead, engineers were content with a simple macroscopic model-for example, viewing a beam as a bundle of fibers.
In Large business ventures were also in a position to undertake scientific studies. The proprietors of Lowell supported James Francis's hydraulic experiments; but for his studies of the strength of cast iron he had to rely on European data.27 The building of the Eads bridge necessitated the adoption of systematic testing of materials, and this practice gradually spread through the steel industry. But these tests were usually geared to the needs of particular projects.28 Thus, while business and government did much to encourage the adoption of experimental methods in technology, they were unwilling to carry out basic research on a sustained basis.
What engineering needed was not just short-term studies directed to specific problems, but a broad and continuous program of basic research in laboratories specifically dedicated to developing the engineering sciences. Robert Thurston, one of the founding fathers of mechanical engineering in America, was perhaps the foremost champion of basic research in the engineering sciences. He wanted Although the experimental approach to technology was readily adopted in America, theory tended to lag behind. American technologists generally lacked the advanced mathematical training needed to make contributions to a sophisticated field like the theory of elasticity. American engineers also tended to pride themselves on their practicality, and regarded mathematical theory as of little real value. The theoretical approach had to prove its utility to be adopted. The difficulty lay with the limitations of existing theory. Although the strength of materials had developed into a science by the 1830s, the range of application of its theory was limited. Very elegant solutions for a limited number of problems were available; but most problems were not solvable.30 Many problems were indeterminate; they could not be solved because the number of unknowns was greater than the number of equations. Unfortunately, the indeterminate cases included some of the ones most frequently met in American engineering practice: the continuous beam and the truss bridge.31
From the 1830s to the 1870s there was a major effort, both in Europe and America, to extend the range of applicability of the engineering sciences. This effort met with remarkable success; by 1880 it was possible to attack a wide range of problems by mathematical theory. In America much of the effort went into the analysis of truss bridges. Squire Whipple's An Elementary and Practical Treatise on Bridge Building, the first version of which appeared in 1847, was a homespun product developed apparently in complete innocence of The rise of engineering sciences had played a vital role. They gave technology equivalents to the theoretical and experimental departments of physical science. They were fostered by engineering colleges which, by 1900, had virtually displaced apprenticeship as a means of training engineers. Scientifically inclined engineers like Thurston played an important role in the founding of professional engineering societies after the Civil War, and an even more important role in producing worthwhile technical literature for engineering journals to publish. But despite the structural similarities between science and technology, the two were further apart in some respects. In many important areas engineering and physics had ceased to speak the same language. * * * In the case of mirror-image twins there is a subtle but irreconcilable difference which is expressed as a change in parity. Between the communities of science and technology there was a switch in values analogous to a change in parity. One way of putting the matter would be to note that while the two communities shared many of the same values, they reversed their rank order. In the physical sciences the highest prestige went to the most abstract and general -that is to the mathematical theorists from Newton to Einstein. Instrumentation and applications generally ranked lowest. In the technological community the successful designer or builder ranked highest, the "mere" theorist the lowest. These differences are inherent in the ends pursued by the two communities: scientists seek to know, technologists to do. These values influence not only the status of occupational specialists, but the nature of the work done and the "language" in which that work is expressed.
An indication of the gap between science and technology is provided by two discoveries, one by Henry Rowland the American physicist and the other by Francis Hopkinson, a British electrical engineer. Rowland, starting from an idea of Faraday, published a paper on magnetic permeability in 1873. James Clerk Maxwell, to whom Rowland sent the paper, recognized its importance, and arranged to have it published in Philosophical Magazine. Hopkinson in 1879 published the results of his investigation of the efficiency of electric dynamos. By graphing his results, he discovered the "characteristic curve" of the direct-current dynamo, a vital key to rational design. Hopkinson could show, for example, how the Edison dynamo could be radically improved by simply changing the dimensions of some of its parts. It was not discovered until several years later that, in a certain sense, Rowland and Hopkinson had made the same discovery.37
There was an irony in the fact that Rowland had "discovered" a key to the design of electric dynamos without realizing it. For Rowland's only earned degree was in engineering; and while he had transferred his primary loyalty to physics, his laboratory at Johns Hopkins was an important center for the training of electrical engineers. Rowland missed the significance of his discovery because he was looking for a law of nature, not a design principle. Each man expressed his work in the terms appropriate to his quest; Rowland discovered a relation between the entities of electromagnetic theory; Hopkinson between basic engineering parameters, such as the input and output of a dynamo. The method of approach, the argument, and the form of presentation differed, each according to its purpose and the audience for which it was intended. The two might be considered equivalent because the engineering variables of Hopkinson could be expressed as functions of the electromagnetic entities employed by Rowland.38
Perhaps no scientist has had a greater impact on technology than James Clerk Maxwell. But his influence was indirect, since few engineers could understand him. It required a creative effort almost equal to Maxwell's own by the British engineer Oliver Heaviside to translate his electromagnetic equations into a form usable by engineers.39 Yet Maxwell was one of those scientists who consciously attempted to contribute to technology. Thus, he developed an important method for solving indeterminate problems in the theory of structures. But this work, too, had to be "translated" for technologists. A British engineer, after quoting Maxwell's conclusions, commented that "few engineers would, however, suspect that the two paragraphs quoted put at their disposal a remarkably simple and accurate method of calculating the stresses in a framework.'40
The cases of Rowland and Maxwell suggest how the interchange between science and technology may take place. For information to pass from one community to the other often involves extensive Because of the status differentials, one would expect engineers with the appropriate training to attempt some work directed at the scientific community. Theory ranks high in science but low in engineering. Many examples of American engineers contributing to basic science could be cited. De Volson Wood used elasticity consid-erations in an attempt to determine the density, pressure, and specific heat of the ether. Although one of the weakest of his works, Wood apparently took inordinate pride in it since he published an expanded version as a book. Henry Turner Eddy did some interesting papers in which he concluded from kinetic considerations that the atom must have some form of internal motion and he postulated the existence of a subatomic particle.41 The only earned degrees of J. Willard Gibbs and Henry Rowland were in engineering. Considering the low status of academic theorists in engineering, not to mention the low status of engineers as a group, their identification with physics is not surprising.
The most important influence of technology on scientific ideas, however, was more indirect. Engineering sciences did not postulate unobservables. Their example was, therefore, a challenge to physics. They contributed to the critical reexamination of the foundations of physics which took place in the latter 19th century. But the engineers themselves contributed little to this movement; it was carried forward by physicists under the banners of positivism and energeticism. The influence of technology on science, like that of science on technology, was an indirect, "second-order" effect.
The coupling of science and technology in the 19th century had at least two important social consequences in the twentieth. It accelerated the pace of technological change, and consequently of social dislocation. It also encouraged engineers to adopt a self-image based on science which served to discourage them from assisting society in meeting the problems they had done so much to create. The scientific self-image caused engineers to portray themselves as logical thinkers, free of all bias and emotion, and it promoted a sort of "above-the-battle" neutrality on the part of the profession. Although engineers gave lip service to the idea of social responsibility, their definition of this responsibility served to prevent effective action. When faced with an actual social problem, engineers have sought objective or "scientific" solutions. In practice, this made the discovery of methods of social engineering a precondition to social action, thus substituting an impossible task for a difficult one. The delusive quest for social engineering led more than one engineer down the blind alley of technocracy.
The reversal of "parity" between science and technology further reduced the engineers' ability to respond effectively to social problems. The scientific community has been better able to act on social issues because those with the greatest prestige were in universities where they were relatively free from pressures from corporations and government. The engineers who enjoyed a corresponding independence lacked sufficient prestige to lead their profession. Prestige and power in engineering went to the "doers," not the "theorists." This had the practical effect of giving the control of the engineering profession to men who were linked by ties of selfinterest to those who were using, and in some cases, misusing technology. This conflict in interest between the leaders of the profession and rank-and-file engineers did much to frustrate the legitimate professional aspirations of American engineers.42 42The author's The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland, 1971) deals with the engineering profession's concern for social responsibility.
